Obfuscation in privacy beacon

Abstract

Techniques are disclosed for obfuscation in a privacy beacon. An example method includes the first device receiving, from a second communication device, a beacon frame comprising a medium access control (MAC) header and an encrypted beacon frame field, the MAC header comprising an obfuscated timing synchronization field (TSF). The first device can select a key for de-obfuscating the TSF based at least in part on information associated with the beacon frame. The first device can de-obfuscate the TSF based at least in part on the key. The first device can decrypt the encrypted beacon frame field of the beacon frame based at least in part on information associated with the de-obfuscated TSF.

What is claimed is: 
     
         1 . A method, comprising:
 by a first communication device:
 receiving, from a second communication device, a beacon frame comprising a medium access control (MAC) header and an encrypted beacon frame field, the MAC header comprising an obfuscated timing synchronization field (TSF); 
 selecting a key for de-obfuscating the TSF based at least in part on information associated with the beacon frame; 
 de-obfuscating the TSF based at least in part on the key; and 
 decrypting the encrypted beacon frame field of the beacon frame based at least in part on information associated with the de-obfuscated TSF. 
   
     
     
         2 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the method further comprises:
 determining whether the beacon frame comprises a second communication device address;   determining whether the first communication device is an intended recipient of the beacon frame based at least in part on whether the beacon frame comprises the second communication device address;   determining whether to discard the beacon frame based at least in part on whether the second communication device is the intended recipient of the beacon frame; and   determining whether to decrypt the encrypted beacon frame field based at least in part on determining whether to discard the beacon frame.   
     
     
         3 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the method further comprises:
 determining a beacon frame type based at least in part on the information associated with the beacon frame, wherein the key is selected based at least in part on the beacon frame type.   
     
     
         4 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the method further comprises:
 identifying the second communication device based at least in part on information associated with the beacon frame, wherein the key is selected based at least in part on an identity of the second communication device.   
     
     
         5 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the method further comprises:
 determining a size of the encrypted beacon frame field based at least in part on information associated with the beacon frame; and   determining a size of the MAC header based at least on information associated with the beacon frame, wherein the encrypted beacon frame field is decrypted based at least in part on the size of the encrypted beacon frame field and a size of the MAC header.   
     
     
         6 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the method further comprises:
 generating an acknowledgement of receipt of the beacon frame based at least in part on information associated with the beacon frame; and   transmitting the acknowledgment to the second communication device.   
     
     
         7 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the obfuscated TSF is obfuscated based on an offset associated with the TSF. 
     
     
         8 . A first communication device, comprising:
 one or more processors; and   one or more computer-readable media having stored thereon a sequence of instructions which, when executed, cause the one or more processors to:
 receive, from a second communication device, a beacon frame comprising a medium access control (MAC) header and an encrypted beacon frame field, the MAC header comprising an obfuscated timing synchronization field (TSF); 
 select a key for de-obfuscating the TSF based at least in part on information associated with the beacon frame; 
 de-obfuscate the TSF based at least in part on the key; and 
 decrypt the encrypted beacon frame field of the beacon frame based at least in part on information associated with the de-obfuscated TSF. 
   
     
     
         9 . The first communication device of  claim 8 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 determine whether the beacon frame comprises a second communication device address;   determine whether the first communication device is an intended recipient of the beacon frame based at least in part on whether the beacon frame comprises the second communication device address;   determine whether to discard the beacon frame based at least in part on whether the second communication device is the intended recipient of the beacon frame; and   determine whether to decrypt the encrypted beacon frame field based at least in part on determining whether to discard the beacon frame.   
     
     
         10 . The first communication device of  claim 8 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 determine a beacon frame type based at least in part on the information associated with the beacon frame, wherein the key is selected based at least in part on the beacon frame type.   
     
     
         11 . The first communication device of  claim 8 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 identify the second communication device based at least in part on information associated with the beacon frame, wherein the key is selected based at least in part on an identity of the second communication device.   
     
     
         12 . The first communication device of  claim 8 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 determine a size of the encrypted beacon frame field based at least in part on information from the beacon frame; and   determine a size of the MAC header based at least on information from the beacon frame, wherein the encrypted beacon frame field is decrypted based at least in part on the size of the encrypted beacon frame field and a size of the MAC header.   
     
     
         13 . The first communication device of  claim 8 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 generate an acknowledgement of receipt of the beacon frame based at least in part on information from the beacon frame; and   transmit the acknowledgment to the second communication device.   
     
     
         14 . The first communication device of  claim 8 , wherein the obfuscated TSF is obfuscated based on an offset associated with the TSF. 
     
     
         15 . One or more computer-readable media having stored thereon a sequence of instructions that, when executed, cause the one or more processors to:
 receive, from a second communication device, a beacon frame comprising a medium access control (MAC) header and an encrypted beacon frame field, the MAC header comprising an obfuscated timing synchronization field (TSF);   select a key for de-obfuscating the TSF based at least in part on information associated with the beacon frame;   de-obfuscate the TSF based at least in part on the key; and   decrypt the encrypted beacon frame field of the beacon frame based at least in part on information associated with the de-obfuscated TSF.   
     
     
         16 . The one or more computer-readable media of  claim 15 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 determine whether the beacon frame comprises a second communication device address;   determine whether the first communication device is an intended recipient of the beacon frame based at least in part on whether the beacon frame comprises the second communication device address;   determine whether to discard the beacon frame based at least in part on whether the second communication device is the intended recipient of the beacon frame; and   determine whether to decrypt the encrypted beacon frame field based at least in part on determining whether to discard the beacon frame.   
     
     
         17 . The one or more computer-readable media of  claim 15 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 determine a beacon frame type based at least in part on the information associated with the beacon frame, wherein the key is selected based at least in part on the beacon frame type.   
     
     
         18 . The one or more computer-readable media of  claim 15 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 identify the second communication device based at least in part on information associated with the beacon frame, wherein the key is selected based at least in part on an identity of the second communication device.   
     
     
         19 . The one or more computer-readable media of  claim 15 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 determine a size of the encrypted beacon frame field based at least in part on information from the beacon frame; and   determine a size of the MAC header based at least on information from the beacon frame, wherein the encrypted beacon frame field is decrypted based at least in part on the size of the encrypted beacon frame field and a size of the MAC header.   
     
     
         20 . The one or more computer-readable media of  claim 15 , wherein the instructions which, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to:
 generate an acknowledgement of receipt of the beacon frame based at least in part on information from the beacon frame; and   transmit the acknowledgment to the second communication device.