Random sample elections

Abstract

A method allows a random sample of a large population of voters to cast votes and for both the unpredictability/un-manipulability of the sample selection and the integrity of the tally to be verified by any interested parties using public information. The problem of vote selling is addressed. Also, a variant allows voters to remain substantially anonymous.

What is claimed is: 
     
         1 . A computerized cryptographic method for at least one election authority to conduct an election where at least some voters vote remotely and the integrity of the corresponding tally can substantially be verified by any interested party, comprising:
 the at least one election authority providing ballots to voters;   the ballots including vote-codes;   receiving from at least one voter at least one of the vote-codes;   such that the selection of at least which voters receive which or any ballots being substantially difficult for the election authority to manipulate; and   such that at least from some observers at least something is hidden about which voters receive which ballots or which vote codes.   
     
     
         2 . The voting method of  claim 1 , comprising:
 at least one election authority issuing at least one decoy ballot; and   the decoy ballots being provided by a method selected from the group consisting of:   unpredictable, responsive to requests, an auction, and algorithmically responsive at least to information about voters;   and   the at least one decoy ballot not contributing a vote in the tally.   
     
     
         3 . The voting method of  claim 2 , wherein
 at least one of the at least one voter that a decoy ballot is issued to being supplied a substantial proof that the ballot is a decoy.   
     
     
         4 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the providing of ballots includes physically combining ballots with hidden vote codes within envelopes that are addressed with temporarily hidden addresses. 
     
     
         5 . The method of  claim 2 , wherein the providing of ballots includes physically combining ballots with hidden vote codes within envelopes that are addressed with temporarily hidden addresses. 
     
     
         6 . The method of  claim 3 , wherein the providing of ballots includes physically combining ballots with hidden vote codes within envelopes that are addressed with temporarily hidden addresses. 
     
     
         7 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the providing of ballots includes a multiparty mixing of recipients of the vote codes. 
     
     
         8 . The method of  claim 2 , wherein the providing of ballots includes a multiparty mixing of recipients of the vote codes. 
     
     
         9 . The method of  claim 3 , wherein the providing of ballots includes a multiparty mixing of recipients of the vote codes. 
     
     
         10 . The method of  claim 7 , wherein the providing of ballots includes a multiparty transformation of the vote codes. 
     
     
         11 . The method of  claim 7 , wherein the providing of ballots includes a mixing of decoy ballots along with real ballots. 
     
     
         12 . The method of  claim 11 , comprising delivering to voters receiving decoy ballots by deniable encryption an indication of whether the ballot is a decoy. 
     
     
         13 . A cryptographic method for conducting an election in which the integrity of the election tally can be verified substantially by any interested party, comprising:
 creating ballot pairs including two individual ballots in each pair and a vote code for each choice of each individual ballot;   commitment to the ballot pair information;
 printing the ballot pairs with indicia consistent with the ballot pair information; 
   opening the votes associated with vote codes that have been voted;   opening at least the vote codes of individual ballots for which a different vote code was voted; and   leaving committed the votes within the same an individual ballot as a voted code.   
     
     
         14 . A cryptographic method for conducting an election in which the integrity of the election tally can be verified substantially by any interested party, comprising:
 creating ballot pairs including two individual ballots in each pair and a vote code for each choice of each individual ballot;   commitment to the ballot pair information;
 printing the ballot pairs with indicia consistent with the ballot pair information; 
   opening the votes associated with vote codes other than those voted;   opening the vote codes voted; and   leaving committed the votes within the same individual ballot as a voted code.   
     
     
         15 . The cryptographic method of  claim 13 , including: opening rows of double ballots not voted. 
     
     
         16 . The cryptographic method of  claim 14 , including: opening rows of double ballots not voted.