Security procedure for controlling the transfer of value units in a chip card gaming system

Abstract

The invention concerns slot machines, such as jackpot or black jack and other casino gambling machines. The machines are designed to operate with gaming cards (CJ 1 ), such as chip cards, and are connected by network to a central management unit ( 1 ). The invention is characterised in that the central management unit comprises a database (BD), wherein are stored data corresponding to those stored on the gaming cards such data concerning the gamester and card identification data (Id) and data (S, Op 1, Op 2 ) concerning the account balance stored in the card (CJ 1 ). The procedure consists in verifying the card data with respect to the central management unit database to ensure the integrity of such a gambling machine system operating with chip cards or contactless cards.

1 . Secured method for monitoring transfers of value units between a plurality of gambling cards (CJ, CJ 1 , CJ 2 , CJn) and a plurality of gambling machines ( 200 ,  200 ′,  200 ″,  200 ′″,  300 ,  300 ′,  300 ″), each machine being connected to a transcriber ( 210 ) of data onto a gambling card (CJ 2 ), the machines being connected in a secured network with a central processing unit ( 1 ) by link means ( 123 ), the method having the following steps, during a gambling operation: 
 reading data stored in a gambling card, particularly an identification number (Id) of the card (CJ 1 ) and/or data (S, Op 1 , Op 2 , Opx) representing the value units debited and/or credited during the preceding gambling operations, the method being characterized by the following steps:  
 exchanging data between the machine ( 200 ) and a database (BD) of the central processing unit ( 1 ) by means ( 123 ) linking the secured network, particularly data representing the balance (S) of the value units and/or the identification number (Id) of the card; and  
 checking that the data stored in the gambling card (CJ 1 ) correspond to the data in the database (BD) in order to monitor the integrity of a system constituted by such a card, such a machine, the network, and the central processing unit.  
 
     
     
         2 . Method according to  claim 1 , characterized by the following step preliminary to the gambling operations: 
 entering, in the database (BD) of the central processing unit ( 1 ) and in the memory of a gambling card (CJ 1 ), data representing an initial balance (S, S 1 ) of value units in a preliminary card-loading operation.    
     
     
         3 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims, characterized by the following step, during a gambling operation: 
 entering, in the database (BD) of the central processing unit ( 1 ), data representing the balance (S 1 ) of value units in gambling card (CJ 1 ).    
     
     
         4 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims, characterized by the following step, during a gambling operation: 
 receiving data representing the balance (S 1 ) of the value units from the central processing unit ( 1 ) to prevent fraud from a card (CJ 2 ) or gambling machine ( 200 .    
     
     
         5 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims, characterized by the checking step of: 
 checking the data representing the balance (S) of the value units read in the memory of gambling card (CJ 1 ) relative to the data (S 1 ) read in the database (BD) to monitor the integrity of the gambling card (CJ 1 ).    
     
     
         6 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims, characterized by the checking step of: 
 checking the identification number (Id) of gambling card (Cil) with an identification key (Kt 1 ) read in the database (BD) of the central processing unit ( 1 ) to check the integrity of the gambling card (CJ 1 ).    
     
     
         7 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims characterized in that the network also has security means (MS 0 ), the method having the following additional step: 
 having the security means (MS 0 ) of the network calculate an authentication certificate (C 1 ) from the secret data (Kt, Kt′) stored in the chip card memory.    
     
     
         8 . Method according to  claim 7  characterized by the following additional step: 
 reading an authentication certificate (C) calculated by gambling card (CJ 1 ) from the secret data (Kt, Kt 1 ) in the card memory.  
 
     
     
         9 . Method according to  claim 8  characterized by the checking step of: 
 checking that the authentication certificate (C) calculated by gambling card (CJ 1 ) corresponds to the authentication certificate (C′) calculated by the security means (MS 0 ) of the network.  
 
     
     
         10 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims characterized in that the network also has distributed security means (MS 0 , MS 1 ), the method having the following additional steps: 
 having the first security means (MS 0 ) of the network calculate a first authentication certificate (C′) from the secret data (Kt, Kt′) in the memory of the first security means (MS 0 ), and    having the second security means (MS 1 ) of the network calculate a second authentication certificate from the secret data (Kt, Kt′) in the memory of the second security means (MS 0 ), and    checking that the first authentication certificate (C′) calculated by the first security means (MS 0 ) of the network corresponds to the second authentication certificate calculated by the second security means (MS 1 ) of the network.    
     
     
         11 . Method according to any one of  claims 7  to  10  characterized in that the data (Id, S) exchanged between machine ( 200 ) and database (BD) of central processing unit ( 1 ) are accompanied by an authentication certificate (C, C′).  
     
     
         12 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims characterized in that security means (MS 1 ) are associated with transcriber (T,  10 ,  110 ,  210 ) that transcribes data onto a gambling card (CJ 1 ) to monitor the integrity of such a card.  
     
     
         13 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims characterized in that security means (MS 1 ) are associated with a gambling machine (T,  200 ,  300 ).  
     
     
         14 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims characterized in that security means are associated with the network link means.  
     
     
         15 . Method according to any one of the foregoing claims characterized in that the security means (MS 0 ) are associated with the central processing unit ( 1 ) to monitor the integrity of the network.  
     
     
         16 . Secured system for monitoring transfers of value units between a plurality of gambling cards (CJ) and a plurality of gambling machines ( 200 ,  300 ), each machine being provided with a transcriber ( 210 ,  310 ) able to debit value units of a gambling card (CJ), the machines being connected in a secured network with a central processing unit ( 1 ) by link means ( 123 ), whereby a gambling card (CJ 1 ) stores data (S, Op 1 , Op 2 , Opx) representing gambling operations conducted, particularly data identifying the card (Id) and data representing the balance (S) of the value units debited and/or credited during previous gambling operations, characterized in that the central processing unit ( 1 ) has a database (BD) that in parallel stores the data (S 1 , Op 101 , Op 102 , Op 10 x) representing gambling operations carried out, particularly card identification data (Id 1 , Id 2 , Idn) and data representing the balances (S 1 , S 2 , Sn) of the value units debited and/or credited during previous gambling operations and in that the monitoring means (BD) check that, for an identified card, the database (BD) data and the card (CJ 1 ) data correspond, particularly that the data (S, S 1 ) representing the value unit balance correspond, in order to verify the integrity of the system.  
     
     
         17 . Secured system according to  claim 16 , characterized in that the gambling card (CJ 1 ) calculates an authentication certificate (C) from the secret data (Kt, Kt′) stored in the memory of card (CJ 1 ).  
     
     
         18 . Secured system according to  claim 16  or  claim 17 , characterized in that in that it additionally comprises a security module (MS 0 , MS 1 ), whereby the security module calculates an authentication certificate (C′) from the secret data (Kt, Kt′) stored in the memory of the module (MS 0 ) and in that the monitoring means (MS 0 ) check that the authentication certificate (C′) calculated by the security module corresponds to the authentication certificate (C′) calculated by the gambling card or by another security module (MS 1 ).  
     
     
         19 . Secured system according to  claim 18 , characterized in that a security module (MS 1 ) is disposed in transcriber (T,  10 ,  210 ,  310 ).  
     
     
         20 . Secured system according to either one of claims  18  and  19 , characterized in that a security module (MS 0 ) is disposed in a gambling machine ( 200 ).  
     
     
         21 . Secured system according to any one of  claims 18  to  20 , characterized in that a security module is disposed in the network link means.  
     
     
         22 . Secured system according to any one of  claims 18  to  21 , characterized in that a security module (MS 0 ) is disposed in central processing unit ( 1 ).  
     
     
         23 . Secured method or system according to any one of the foregoing claims, characterized in that a gambling card is a chip card.  
     
     
         24 . Secured method or system according to any one of the foregoing claims, characterized in that a gambling card is a contactless card.  
     
     
         25 . Secured method or system according to any one of the foregoing claims, characterized in that a gambling card is a bank card.