Randomized bilateral trust (RABiT): trust building connectivity for cyber space

Abstract

This invention amounts to tools and procedures designed to use randomness sources to establish a secure communication between two nodes in cyber space, and then building on these bilateral trust elements to spread trust throughout the network. Applications include online identity management, and secure payment platforms. This trust build-up from bilateral connections may serve as a blockchain alternative. The bilateral trust solution is not based on mathematical complexity, as the prevailing solutions, but rather on the perfect unpredictability of quantum grade randomness, and as such it is well positioned to withstand cryptanalytic attacks based on quantum computing capability now secretly developed by powerful adversaries.

What is claimed is: 
     
       1. A computer-implemented method comprising a computer communication network, where parties A, B, and C are active nodes, and where parties A and B are mutual strangers, having no prior exchange of information, and where the method enables party A and party B to establish a shared secret using only bilateral network messages, the contents of which is exposed to party C who wishes to prevent parties A and B from establishing a shared secret, and
 a publicly exposed set S comprising s mathematical entities where each entity has p properties, where each property i (i=1, 2, . . . p) has a range of r possible values v i1 , v i2 , . . . v ir  
 and where (i) party A randomly and secretly selects n elements in S: a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n , designated as “Party A Candidates”, and party B randomly and secretly selects n elements in S: b 1 , b 2 , . . . b n , designated as “Party B Candidates”, then (ii) 
 party A selects a property i (i=1, 2, . . . p) and communicates to party B the values of property i within the Party A Candidates: a 1i , a 2i , . . . a ni , referred to as “Property i list of Party A”, then (iii) 
 party B eliminates from Party B candidates all the entities for which the value of property i is not listed in Property i list of Party A, then (iv) 
 party B selects a property j (j=1, 2, . . . (i−1), (i+1), . . . p) and communicates to party A the values of property j within the Party B Candidates: b 1j , b 2j , . . . b n′j , referred to as “Property j list of Party B”, and where n′≤n is the number of party B candidates after step (iii), then (v) 
 party A eliminates from Party A candidates all the elements for which the value of property j is not listed in Property j list of party B, 
 and where (vi) parties A and B repeat steps (ii)-(v) with other properties k, l, m . . . where (k, l, m=1, 2, . . . p) until either: 
 (α) party A or party B are left with no candidates, in which case party A and party B repeat steps (i) to (vi), or 
 (β) party A is left with one candidate, and party B is left with the same candidate, which is used as a shared secret encryption key by either party A, or party B to pass a digital coin or any token to the other party, for secure decryption of the coin or token. 
 
 
     
     
       2. The method of  claim 1  also comprising a public ledger and a Verifier node that verifies that parties A and B participated in the process of method  1 ,
 wherein the property lists for the various properties which passed between party A and party B, referred to as “the Dialogue,” is 
 being stored in the public ledger, so that parties A and B will prove that they have been the parties to the Dialogue by exposing Party A Candidates and Party B Candidates so that the Verifier can verify that the Party A Candidates and the Party B Candidates when handled via the method in  claim 1  generate the dialogue as stored in the public ledger.